Responder is a powerful network exploitation tool used to capture, relay, and abuse authentication traffic in Windows environments. It targets LLMNR, NBT-NS, and MDNS broadcasts—protocols that attempt to resolve hostnames when DNS fails. By poisoning these name-resolution requests, Responder tricks victims into sending hashed credentials or authentication attempts to the attacker. This makes Responder essential for internal network pentesting, credential harvesting, and launching relay attacks.
Understanding Responder’s Role
Responder helps pentesters:
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Capture NTLMv1/NTLMv2 password hashes
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Force authentication attempts from Windows hosts
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Poison LLMNR/NBT-NS/MDNS traffic
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Harvest usernames, machine accounts, and admin credentials
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Relay captured hashes to SMB/HTTP/etc.
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Identify insecure network configurations
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Launch SMB/HTTP relay attacks for remote code execution
Most corporate networks have LLMNR/NBT-NS enabled by default, making Responder extremely effective.
How Responder Poisoning Works
When a Windows machine tries to reach a hostname that DNS cannot resolve:
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The machine broadcasts LLMNR/NBT-NS queries on the LAN
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Responder answers “I am that host” (spoofing)
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Victim connects to the attacker assuming it’s the legitimate host
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Authentication attempt is sent to the attacker (NTLM hashes)
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Hashes are captured or relayed to another host
This process requires no interaction from the victim.
Starting Responder
Navigate to Responder’s directory:
cd /usr/share/responder
Start poisoning on an interface (e.g., eth0):
sudo responder -I eth0
Responder begins listening for:
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LLMNR
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NBT-NS
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MDNS
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SMB
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HTTP
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LDAP
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FTP
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SMTP
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Kerberos (limited)
Captured hashes appear in:
Responder/logs/
Capturing NTLM Hashes
Responder automatically grabs NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 hashes.
Look for lines like:
[*] NTLMv2-SSP Client : WIN10-PC
[*] NTLMv2-SSP Hash : user::domain:hash
These hashes can be cracked with tools like:
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hashcat
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john the ripper
Cracking NTLMv2 (Example)
hashcat -m 5600 hash.txt wordlist.txt
If the password is weak → instant compromise.
Forcing Authentication (WPAD Attack)
WPAD (Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol) is often enabled on Windows networks. Responder exploits this to force automatic authentication.
Enable WPAD in Responder config:
Responder.conf
Set:
WPAD = On
Restart Responder:
sudo responder -I eth0
Victims automatically try to fetch proxy scripts, leaking NTLM hashes.
Credential Harvesting via SMB or HTTP
Responder spoofs SMB and HTTP servers.
SMB captures hashed credentials:
SMB NTLMv2 hash from victim
HTTP captures Basic authentication or NTLM handshake credentials.
These leaks occur whenever users:
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Open network shares
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Access mapped drives
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Mistype hostnames
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Access internal web apps that fail DNS lookup
Relay Attacks with Responder + ntlmrelayx
Instead of cracking hashes, relay them to another machine for direct access.
Disable SMB in Responder (to allow relaying):
SMB = Off
Start Responder:
sudo responder -I eth0
Start ntlmrelayx (from Impacket):
sudo ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support
If a privileged user authenticates, ntlmrelayx can:
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Get a shell
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Dump SAM
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Execute commands
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Add users
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Dump LSASS
This leads to instant lateral movement.
Enumerating Hosts That Use LLMNR/NBT-NS
Monitor Responder logs for hostname queries such as:
Query for FILESERVER01
Query for BACKUPSRV
Query for ADMIN-PC
Seeing these queries confirms:
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LLMNR is active
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DNS resolution failures are common
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Internal workstation misconfigurations exist
This creates reliable credential-capture opportunities.
Detecting and Investigating Network Traffic
You can observe poisoned responses with:
Using tcpdump
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 port 5355 or port 137
5355 = LLMNR
137 = NBT-NS
Look for broadcast queries followed by attacker replies.
Responder Logs and Output Analysis
Logs include:
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NTLMv2 hashes
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HTTP cleartext creds
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SMB authentication attempts
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Hostnames and users
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WPAD requests
Files typically found in:
Responder/logs/
These logs provide usernames, domain names, and access patterns.
When Responder Works Best
Responder succeeds when:
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LLMNR is enabled (default Windows setting)
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NBT-NS is enabled
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DNS misconfigurations force fallback queries
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WPAD is enabled
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Users browse to nonexistent hosts
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Mapped drives reference dead servers
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Internal networks lack segmentation
These conditions exist in most enterprise networks.
Preventing Detection
Responder is noisy if run carelessly. For stealth:
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Disable SMB to avoid conflicts
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Use ntlmrelayx (relay instead of capture)
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Limit interface broadcasts
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Avoid running in high-visibility environments
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Monitor for logs instead of flooding replies
Stealthy poisoning increases the chance of capturing high-value credentials.
Why Responder Mastery Matters
Responder remains one of the most effective internal network attack tools. It allows pentesters to:
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Capture high-privilege NTLM hashes
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Force authentication traffic
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Perform NTLM relay to compromise servers
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Map hostname resolution weaknesses
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Move laterally without initial creds
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Identify insecure network configurations
Responder turns simple broadcast traffic into powerful credential-gathering opportunities.
Intel Dump
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Responder captures NTLM hashes via LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning
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WPAD attack forces automatic authentication
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Use ntlmrelayx for relay-based remote access
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Logs store usernames, hashes, and queried hostnames
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Disabling SMB enables relaying
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Highly effective inside Windows enterprise networks