LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning exploits Windows name-resolution fallback mechanisms to trick hosts into sending NTLM authentication to the attacker. When a Windows machine cannot resolve a hostname through DNS, it broadcasts LLMNR or NBT-NS queries across the LAN. Any device on the network can reply — and if an attacker responds first, the victim will send NTLM authentication to the attacker. This makes LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning one of the most effective internal network exploitation techniques.
How LLMNR and NBT-NS Work
Windows uses multiple steps to resolve hostnames:
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Checks local cache
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Queries DNS
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If DNS fails → sends LLMNR multicast query
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If still unresolved → sends NBT-NS broadcast query
These queries ask: “Who has HOSTNAME?”
Any host can reply — there is no authentication.
Attackers exploit this by sending fake replies and forcing victims to authenticate to the attacker’s machine.
Why These Protocols Are Vulnerable
LLMNR and NBT-NS are inherently insecure because:
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They trust any device on the LAN
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They do not validate responses
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They allow unauthenticated fallback name resolution
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They trigger NTLM authentication automatically
This makes interception extremely easy in flat networks.
Identifying LLMNR/NBT-NS Traffic
Before poisoning, inspect whether hosts are sending broadcast or multicast name-resolution requests.
Capturing LLMNR Traffic
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 port 5355
Capturing NBT-NS Traffic
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 port 137
If you see frequent multicast/broadcast queries, the network is vulnerable.
Performing LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning with Responder
Responder is the primary tool for poisoning and capturing NTLM hashes.
Running Responder
sudo responder -I eth0
Responder listens for:
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LLMNR queries
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NBT-NS broadcasts
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MDNS queries
When a victim requests a non-existent hostname, Responder:
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Replies pretending to be that host
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Forces the victim to authenticate
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Captures NTLMv2 hashes
Captured hashes are saved in the Responder/logs directory.
Capturing NTLM Hashes
Typical captured fields include:
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Username
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Domain
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NTLMv2 hash
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Challenge/response values
Hashes can be cracked offline using Hashcat.
Cracking NTLMv2 Hashes
hashcat -m 5600 hash.txt wordlist.txt
If the password is weak, cracking succeeds quickly.
Upgrading to SMB Relay Attacks
If SMB signing is not required, NTLM authentication captured from LLMNR poisoning can be relayed to another internal host.
Checking SMB Signing
nmap --script smb-security-mode -p445 10.10.10.5
If signing is not required → relay is possible.
Running NTLM RelayX
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support
This may allow:
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Command execution
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File system access
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Dumping SAM/NTDS
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Lateral movement
LLMNR poisoning is often the first step toward domain compromise.
Exploiting WPAD
If WPAD (Web Proxy Auto Discovery) is enabled, Responder exploits it automatically.
Effects include:
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Intercepting HTTP/HTTPS traffic
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Proxying victim traffic
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Capturing additional credentials
This significantly expands the attack impact.
Manual LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning with Bettercap
Bettercap provides another poisoning method.
Starting Bettercap
sudo bettercap -iface eth0
Enabling Poisoning
net.probe on
net.recon on
llmnr.spoof on
nbns.spoof on
Bettercap then injects rogue LLMNR/NBT-NS responses, capturing NTLM hashes.
Indicators of LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
During testing, pentesters look for:
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Broadcast name resolution
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Absence of DNS for internal systems
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Repeated queries for the same host
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WPAD lookups
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Lack of segmentation
Networks using these fallback protocols are highly vulnerable.
Post-Exploitation After Hash Capture
Once NTLM hashes are captured or cracked, pentesters can:
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Attempt password spraying
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Perform pass-the-hash
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Access file shares
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Move laterally
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Enumerate domain structure
LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning often leads to full Active Directory compromise.
Why LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Matters
These legacy protocols allow silent credential interception on almost any Windows network that lacks proper defenses. Poisoning provides:
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NTLMv2 hashes
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Relay opportunities
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Lateral movement paths
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Domain footholds
It remains one of the highest-impact internal pentesting techniques.
Intel Dump
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LLMNR/NBT-NS allow unauthenticated name-resolution replies
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Tools: Responder, Bettercap, ntlmrelayx
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Captured NTLM hashes enable cracking and pass-the-hash
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SMB signing determines whether relay attacks are possible
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These attacks often lead to domain compromise